Header menu link for other important links
Exploiting the leakage: Analysis of some authenticated encryption schemes
D. Chang, A.K. Chauhan, N. Gupta, A. Jati,
Published in Springer Verlag
Volume: 10076 LNCS
Pages: 383 - 401
The ongoing CAESAR competition, aimed at finding robust and secure authenticated encryption schemes provides many new submissions for analysis. We analyzed many schemes and came across a plenitude of techniques, design ideals and security notions. In view of the above, we present key recovery attacks using DPA for Deoxys, Joltik and ELmD, and a forgery attack on AEGIS. In our analysis of the various schemes, we found out that, schemes using Sponge constructions with pre-initialized keys such as Ascon, ICEPOLE, Keyak, NORX, PRIMATEs, etc. were significantly harder to attack than contemporary designs using standard building blocks from a side channel perspective. We also implement and demonstrate an attack on Joltik-BC, to recover the key in roughly 50–60 traces. © Springer International Publishing AG 2016.